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Vulnerability, therapeutic misconception and informed consent: is there a need for special 
treatment of pregnant women in fetus-regarding clinical trials? 
Abstract 
Historically, women have been considered vulnerable research subjects and have rarely been 
enrolled in clinical trials. The concept of vulnerability in clinical research is mentioned in a number of 
international regulations but has never been clearly defined. Generally vulnerability is seen as linked 
with lack of or limited decision-making capacity, and in terms of clinical trials relates to children and 
adults unable to give informed consent due to their physical or mental incapacity. This lack of or 
limited decision-making capacity is regarded as putting these groups at risk of exploitation where 
others can take unfair advantage of them. With regard to pregnant women, the notion of 
vulnerability has, however, been criticised since they are generally seen as able to make 
autonomous decisions and are not particularly susceptible to exploitation. This paper suggests, that 
all the same an argument can be presented for the vulnerability of a specific group of pregnant 
women, namely those newly diagnosed with a fetal condition for which there is no effective 
treatment and the only option is enrolment in a clinical trial.  Where such vulnerability exists special 
measures are necessary to ensure their consent to become part of a scientific investigation is free, 
informed and voluntary. The requirements of English law and professional ethical guidance 
regarding the provision of information and the need for understanding the information are currently 
not stringent enough. Because of the emotional stress these pregnant women are under the ethical 
question as to the nature of their autonomy and decision-making capacity remains.  
 
Introduction 
Historically, women have been considered vulnerable research subjects and so women of 
child-bearing age have rarely been enrolled in clinical trials. The arguments against the 
inclusion of women have been that the different physiology of women to that of men added 
a further variable to the study,[1, 2] and that harm might ensue to the fetus with the risk of 
ethical and legal problems for the clinical investigators and sponsors.[2]   
 
The concept of vulnerability in clinical research is mentioned in a number of international 
and national regulations but it has never been clearly defined. The Declaration of Helsinki 
2013 speaks of some groups and individuals as being particularly vulnerable with an 
increased likelihood of being wronged or of incurring additional harm. The US Federal 
Research Guidelines refer to the need for minimal risks regarding the participation of 
vulnerable people in clinical trials. In England, the Medicine for Human Use (Clinical Trials) 
Regulations 2004 (henceforth the current CTRs) simply mention vulnerable groups without 
giving any further details.[3]   The proposed new EU Regulation 536/2014 on Clinical trials 
on medicinal products for human use (henceforth the proposed CTR), which has been 
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adopted by the EU Member States but will not apply in England before 28 May 2016, also 
does not define the criteria for vulnerability.  However, it includes pregnant women 
amongst the groups of vulnerable research subjects and restricts the conduct of clinical 
trials on pregnant women unless certain conditions are met.[4] 
Vulnerability is often seen as linked with lack of or limited decision-making capacity, and in 
terms of clinical trials relates to children and adults who are unable to give informed 
consent due to their physical or mental incapacity. This lack of or limited decision-making 
capacity is regarded as putting these groups at risk of exploitation where others can take 
unfair advantage of them to the subject’s detriment.[5] With regard to pregnant women, 
the notion of vulnerability has, however, been criticised since pregnant women are 
generally seen as able to make autonomous decisions and are not considered particularly 
susceptible to exploitation.[5] This is the case whether or not the woman and her fetus are 
considered a double unit, consisting of two parts, or a single unit, since the woman is the 
only person who can and should make a decision in the case of an invitation to participate in 
a clinical trial.[5] This article suggests, however, that even if pregnant women as research 
subjects are not inherently vulnerable,[2, 5, 6] an argument can be presented for the 
vulnerability of a specific group of pregnant women, namely those newly diagnosed with a 
fetal condition for which the only option apart from watchful waiting is enrolment in a 
clinical trial.  Where such vulnerability exists special measures are necessary to ensure their 
consent to become part of a scientific investigation is free, informed and voluntary. 
Special circumstances of vulnerability 
In his critique of the inherent vulnerability of specific groups or sub-groups, Kipnis 
formulates six different forms of vulnerability for clinical research: cognitive, juridic, 
deferential, medical, allocational and infrastructural.[7] He sees them as ‘a checklist of 
circumstances or contexts that, along with other conditions, can invalidate the permissibility 
of research’ because they ‘call into question the efficacy of consent’. According to him, one 
or more of these vulnerabilities would justify the implementation of supplementary 
measures in the design of the trial protocol as a condition for proceeding.  While research 
candidates may display several or all of these vulnerabilities, as will be demonstrated, it is   
Kipnis’ concepts of cognitive and medical vulnerabilities most likely to be exhibited by 
pregnant women newly diagnosed with a fetal condition.  
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Kipnis describes cognitive vulnerability as the lack of or limited decision-making capacity of 
research subjects with some intellectual or developmental barrier to participating in the 
informed consent process. However, cognitive vulnerability in pregnant women generally 
has been disputed as pregnant women are unlikely to lack decision-making capacity because 
of their pregnancy, except possibly in active labour.[2,5] All the same, the cognitive 
functioning of a pregnant woman may be affected because of her unfamiliarity with the 
language in complex clinical trials and because of the available time frame for decision-
making. Cognitive functioning and thus decision-making capacity may also be affected by 
the highly emotional state of the pregnant woman at the time of invitation to the trial 
where such an invitation precedes the diagnosis of a fetal condition for which there is no 
effective treatment option.[8] In such circumstances they may feel very afraid and develop 
‘in the midst of crisis’[7] catastrophic thinking blocking their ability to deliberate and 
derailing decision-making capacity.[8]   
Medical vulnerability exists for Kipnis in the situation where a proposed research participant 
suffers a serious health-related condition for which there is no satisfactory remedy.[7] 
Medically vulnerable patients are often recruited because there is no treatment for their 
disease so that the patient who has few or no other options is liable to consent to 
participate in the trial whatever the risks involved. Although ‘forced choice alone does not 
annul consent’, a research subject in this position clearly has ‘a poor bargaining position’.[7] 
Of course, pregnant women who are invited to participate in a trial because of their 
condition are not necessarily medically vulnerable to the extent that they would take 
unreasonable risks.[2] Rather, the vulnerability of pregnant women may more often be as a 
result of their lack of inclusion in clinical trials when drugs never tested in pregnancy are 
prescribed to them.[2, 5] However, the description of a pregnant woman’s medical 
vulnerability generally ought to be viewed as dependent on the context. In a wanted 
pregnancy where her fetus is diagnosed with a condition for which there is no satisfactory 
remedy and the woman is invited to participate in a trial with the fetus as the sole object of 
the research, she may well be in a situation of medical vulnerability. She may be faced with 
the prospect of doing nothing and possibly losing her unborn child. Where the trial 
potentially has benefits for the fetus, however minor, the woman may ignore any possible 
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risks to herself, and may feel morally obliged to do the best for her ‘unborn child’ and focus 
solely on the glimmer of hope for its survival.  
Findings from British and German interview studies with pregnant women who were either 
enrolled or asked their opinion about enrolling in clinical trials in critical situations or [9, 10] 
support the view that in situations where the pregnant woman feels moral pressure to do 
what is best for her ‘unborn child’, she is likely to be at higher risk of exploitation. In the 
German interview study,[10] which tested hypothetical scenarios, almost all women would 
participate in a trial if it was for the benefit of the fetus. Even if there was a risk to 
themselves, as long as there was great potential benefit to the fetus some women would 
ignore or downplay it. In the British interview study [9] where women were asked about 
their experience of participating in an actual trial during their pregnancy, the findings were 
similar. The main motivation for taking part was the hope of a delay in pre-term labour and 
therefore an improved outcome of their pregnancy. Although they were informed of the 
risks of the trial, most women believed at the time of the interview that there had been no 
risk associated with taking part. Therefore, medical vulnerability is not only linked with the 
risk of exploitation but also with the problem of therapeutic misconception. 
 
Therapeutic misconception 
Medical vulnerability due to restricted treatment choices can give rise to therapeutic 
misconception by the research participant. Therapeutic misconception describes the 
situation where research subjects who have legal capacity do not understand the distinction 
between clinical care and clinical research, and misinterpret the nature of clinical research 
and the intentions of the researchers.[7, 11] This problem is acute in patients who know 
that there is no treatment or no satisfactory treatment for their condition. Although they 
have been informed that they are being invited to participate in a trial, they tend to enter 
the trial in the hope that the treatment works and that they will benefit from it.[7] This 
problem can also be identified in pregnant women with a wanted pregnancy who have been 
informed that their fetus has a developmental abnormality and where the only options – 
apart from trial participation – are the termination of pregnancy or watchful waiting.  
These women will generally want to do whatever possible to have as healthy a child as 
possible. However, even under ideal conditions people may not appreciate the distinction 
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between clinical care and clinical research.[12, 13] In the case of an affected pregnancy, the 
conditions are not ideal. Cognitive and medical vulnerability may coincide so that the 
pregnant woman’s decisions about participating in a fetus-regarding clinical trial are likely to 
be based on unreasonable expectations. These expectations are heightened by the fact that 
such early phase trials will tend to be hybrid phase I/II trials as phase I trials are not 
acceptable in this situation for legal and ethical reasons.[12] Phase I/II are designed to 
investigate the safety, dosage and efficacy of a compound whereas phase I trials only assess 
the toxicity of a compound and are generally carried out in healthy volunteers or, under 
certain circumstances, in patients with the condition.  If we consider a pregnant woman as a 
double unit, a pregnant woman whose pregnancy is affected is neither a healthy volunteer 
nor is she strictly speaking the patient with the condition. However, the fact that a phase I/II 
trial assesses dosage and efficacy is likely to create the impression of therapeutic intent 
where in reality there is no or only borderline therapeutic intent.[13] The dosages given to 
reduce dose-related toxicity would usually be too low, at least for the first patient cohort, 
for the fetus to derive any benefit.  
In addition, the vulnerability of the pregnant woman who is invited to participate in a fetus-
regarding trial is amplified by her highly stressed emotional state after she has just been 
informed that her ‘unborn baby’ has or is likely to develop serious health problems or 
disabilities.[14] The pregnant woman’s emotions towards her fetus and the wish for a 
healthy baby are likely to override all her other responses and may even reduce, at least 
temporarily, her decision-making capacity.[8, 14] In this state, the woman is even more 
likely to construe a therapeutic intention when such an intention is absent. Adding to the 
woman’s emotional turmoil is the fact that when making her decision she will often deal 
with researchers who are also doctors and care-givers. She is likely to trust that they will 
prioritise her health and that of her fetus.[15] The doctor-patient relationship contains 
considerable emotions [11, 15] and trust is one of these.  
When facing such traumatic circumstances during pregnancy it is likely that the woman’s 
emotions temporarily block her capacity for decision-making.[11, 16] Even in the absence of 
misinformation she is unable to make a free choice.  She is vulnerable and her autonomy is 
compromised in her ability to understand and weigh up the information provided.  Where 
she incorrectly attributes primarily therapeutic intent to a trial she is likely to underestimate 
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the risks and overestimate the benefits of the trial.[9, 10, 15] It is therefore questionable the 
extent to which she is legally and ethically temporarily able to provide genuine informed 
consent unless this incapacity is addressed explicitly and effectively.  
Some proposed measures dealing with cognitive and medical vulnerabilities  
In these circumstances of medical and cognitive vulnerability, for the decision-making to be 
truly based on the pregnant woman’s own choice she needs to have time to reflect and not 
be unduly influenced by clinical investigators and researchers. As with other vulnerable 
research subjects, particular care needs to be taken so that she understands the nature, the 
objectives, risks and inconveniences of the trial to herself and her fetus. This means that she 
should be informed that she is invited to take part in an experiment that aims to answer a 
scientific question. She should be informed that there is no or very little likelihood of any 
benefit to the fetus but that it may help future pregnant women who have been given the 
same diagnosis of fetal problems. It needs to be made clear to her that there may be risks to 
her own health. In particular, she also needs to understand the likely risks for her fetus, such 
as whether the trial might entail a greater risk of stillbirth. To enable these issues to be 
understood, comprehension ought to be assessed as part of the informed consent 
process.[17] Thus, it has been suggested that understanding may be aided by the use of 
consent forms which use short, simplified sentences with non-technical language.[17] In 
addition, the use of terms such as trial and experiment rather than treatment, and of 
researcher and investigator rather than doctor may help minimise the risk of therapeutic 
misconception.[15, 17] Finally, it has been demonstrated that an extended discussion 
between the researcher and the research participant is much more likely to improve 
understanding [17, 18] than any improvements to the consent form, especially where the 
woman is in a highly stressed emotional state.  
Law and ethics of informed consent in clinical trials 
It is the responsibility of the personnel recruiting trial participants to ensure that their 
participation in the research is based on an adequate understanding of the nature of the 
trial and its implications and risks. This is even more important in clinical trials that involve 
complicated, novel drugs or procedures. However, legally, there is little distinction between 
the understanding required for the consent a patient gives for day-to-day medical treatment 
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and for taking part in research. Generally, English law presumes that a patient is 
autonomous and has the capacity to make decisions about consent to treatment. [19]  
The patient’s informed consent or lack thereof is governed by the law of negligence in 
England.  The focus in negligence has been on the doctor’s behaviour, the doctor’s duty to 
provide the patient with information [20, 21] but there has not been an insistence on the 
understanding of the patient. This is despite the fact that for a patient to have made an 
informed decision suggests a process of deliberation based on understanding.  Thus, in Al 
Hamwi v Johnston,[22] a case which dealt with the explanation of the amniocentesis test to 
a pregnant woman, the High Court judge held that although clinicians should take 
reasonable steps to satisfy themselves that the patient has understood the information 
provided, the obligation to ensure that the patient has understood would be too onerous an 
obligation on the clinician[22, 23] Informed consent in negligence therefore elided the 
distinction between a patient who has been merely notified rather than one who 
comprehends, the essentially one-way process of imparting information and the kind of 
dialogue that truly equips the patient to work towards a decision.[21]  
However, this may no longer be good law according to the recent decision of the Supreme 
Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [24]. The judgment by the Law Lords 
placed greater emphasis on the need for the understanding of the patient; they regarded 
the advisory role of the doctor as involving ‘dialogue, the aim of which is to ensure that the 
patient understands … so that she is then in a position to make an informed decision.’  The 
information provided must therefore be comprehensible: ‘The doctor's duty is not … 
fulfilled by bombarding the patient with technical information which she cannot reasonably 
be expected to grasp.’[24] However, their Lordships did not articulate what steps a doctor 
needs to take to discharge her duty and ascertain that the patient has understood the 
information. [25] 
The case itself concerned a pregnant diabetic patient who alleged lack of disclosure by the 
defendant obstetrician of the risk of shoulder dystocia involved in vaginal delivery. The 
appellant claimed that had she had been warned about this risk she would have opted for a 
Caesarean section.  While the decision by the House of Lords in Sidaway v Board of 
Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [26] in 1985 had led to much academic debate over 
the standard of the doctor’s duty to disclose, namely whether the significance or materiality 
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of the treatment risks and benefits which need to be disclosed are to be judged by a 
standard more favourable to the doctor, i.e. the Bolam [27] standard, or according to the 
prudent patient standard, [26] the Supreme Court in Montgomery clarified the matter 
holding that the Bolam test had no place regarding information disclosure. Following the 
decision in the Australian case of Rogers v Whitaker [28] their Lordships held that the doctor 
is under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure the patient is aware of any material risks 
involved in the treatment and of reasonable alternatives. A risk was defined as material if, in 
the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would 
be likely to attach significance to the risk, or if the doctor is or should reasonably be aware 
that the patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it. The risk 
disclosure remains, however, subject to therapeutic privilege so that a doctor can withhold 
information about a risk if she is satisfied that the disclosure would be seriously detrimental 
to the patient’s health.  Despite this exception, Montgomery promotes the notion of patient 
autonomy and patient rights in the treatment setting speaking of ‘patients as persons 
holding rights’, rather than recipients of the care of the medical profession [24].  In that it 
not only follows the ideas already conveyed by their Lordships in Chester v Afshar [29], a 
case on information disclosure and causation,  but it also comes close to current GMC 
guidance [30]. Thus the guidance ‘Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions 
Together’ refers to the relationship between doctor and patient as a partnership and more 
specifically, regarding the patient’s informed consent, it states that doctors should check 
whether the patient has understood the information she has been given and also that they 
should check whether the patient needs any additional support to understand the 
information.[30] 
While at least pre-Montgomery GMC guidance thus tended to place more stringent 
conditions on patient consent to treatment than the law [30, 31] GMC guidance does place 
more demanding conditions on consent to research than consent to treatment. After all the 
goal of research is to obtain generalizable new knowledge rather than provide the individual 
with therapeutic benefit so that a higher consent standard ought to be in place.  This 
distinction also holds when comparing the consent requirements for research and for, 
already approved, new medical technologies such as, for example, in utero repair of spina 
bifida and shunting for urinary tract obstructions.   Thus, in ‘Consent to Research’ [31] the 
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GMC guidance states as an overriding duty when conducting research doctors must make 
sure that people are given information in a way that they can understand. The guidance 
then continues with the lesser obligation that doctors should check that people understand 
the terms used and any explanation given about the proposed research method. If 
necessary, they should support their discussion with simple and accurate written material or 
visual or other aids.  
 
Legally, the conditions for informed consent to research are governed by the current CTRs  
2004 [3] and will in future be governed by the proposed CTR 2014 [4].   The current CTRs 
make little attempt at ensuring that the research subject has actually understood the 
information nor do they go as far as the GMC guidance on research [31]. Thus Schedule 1 
(part 1) of the current CTRs states that an adult with capacity gives informed consent if her 
decision to take part in the trial is given freely after being informed of the nature, 
significance, implications and risks of the trial. Only Part 3 adds the more onerous condition 
that the research subject must have had an interview with the clinical investigator in which 
she has been given the opportunity to understand the objectives, risks and inconveniences 
of the trial and the conditions under which it is to be conducted. Being given the 
opportunity to understand the objectives is not the same as requiring that what has been 
communicated has actually been understood.  
In contrast, the proposed CTR requires that information given for the purposes of obtaining 
informed consent shall enable the research to understand the nature, objectives, benefits, 
implications, risks and inconveniences of the clinical trial (Article 28 (2)(a)).  Although not as 
specific as the GMC guidance ‘Consent to Research’ it makes some attempt at encouraging 
the understanding of the research subject when consenting to trial participation.  Article 29 
(2)(b) refers to the need for the information to the research subject to be kept 
‘comprehensive, concise, clear, relevant, and understandable to a layperson’.  The 
information is to be provided in an interview with a member of the investigating team 
(Article 29 (2)(c)) who shall pay particular attention to the information needs of the research 
subject, the methods of imparting the information and verifying the understanding of the 
research subject (Article 29 (4)).   
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Despite the fact that the proposed CTR imposes stricter informed consent requirements 
than the current CTRs it still does not go far enough to prevent the risk of therapeutic 
misconception of vulnerable research participants such as the group of pregnant women 
under discussion.  Still, doctors and clinical investigators will look to the GMC rather than to 
the law reports for guidance on professional and ethical standards, but it is questionable 
whether the obligations imposed by the GMC are sufficient.  When dealing with this group 
of pregnant women affected by cognitive and medical vulnerabilities and additionally under 
considerable emotional stress [16] there is a need to implement strategies to eliminate the 
therapeutic misconception and to ensure that they understand the information provided 
and make the decision to participate freely and voluntarily. To achieve such understanding 
of a vulnerable person requires not only skill on the part of clinical investigators as they will 
have to gauge each individual’s level of comprehension, it will also require extended, frank 
discussion in language liable not to mislead. [15, 18]   
Conclusion 
Pregnant women who have been diagnosed with a severe fetal condition for which there is 
no treatment other than expectant obstetric management and who are offered the option 
to participate in an early phase trial must be considered cognitively and medically 
vulnerable research participants prone to the risk of therapeutic misconception. Although 
they may legally have the decision-making capacity to sign a consent form and do so 
voluntarily, as has been argued, the requirements of English law and GMC guidance 
regarding the provision of information and the need for understanding the information are 
not stringent enough. Thus, the ethical question as to the nature of these pregnant 
women’s autonomy and decision-making capacity remains. Because of the emotional stress 
these women are under when being informed that there is no satisfactory treatment for the 
condition of their fetus they are less likely to comprehend the information given to them 
and more likely to misconstrue a trial as something that offers a lifeline to their fetus. Apart 
from any perceived social and biological imperative to produce a child, they may feel under 
psychological pressure to do what is ‘best for baby’.  
In the context of being invited to participate in fetus-regarding trials, it is only when 
pregnant women are treated as cognitively and medically vulnerable research participants 
that they will not be under undue risk of being enrolled in ‘exploitative’ research. Ensuring 
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actual comprehension in the informed consent process over and above what the law and 
GMC guidance currently demand would reduce or even eliminate this risk.   Extended 
dialogue between the researcher and the pregnant woman to improve comprehension is 
essential and should avoid terms giving the impression that she and/or her fetus will receive 
treatment.  She should be given sufficient time to consider the issues and to discuss them 
with her partner, family and friends.  She should be informed in non-technical language that 
early phase trials are experiments that aim to answer a scientific question. Further, the 
message should be clearly conveyed that the experiment is unlikely benefit her unborn child 
and that there may be risks to her own health and possibly also to her fetus.  Such an 
approach would help safeguard that, despite these women’s poor bargaining position, their 
consent is based on comprehending the information they have been given and that their 
trial participation is really free, voluntary and informed. 
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